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Renegotiating Reproductive Technologies: 
 The “Public Foetus” revisited 
 
“Nowhere is the relationship between gender and technology more vigorously 
contested than in the sphere of human reproduction. Women are the bearers, 
and in most societies the primary nurturers of children. This means that 
reproductive technologies are of particular significance to them.” (Wajcman 
1991:54) 
 
In general, I would argue that there is much value in revisiting issues such as 
foetal imaging, since the significance of this increasingly mainstream 
technology and the images it produces can sometimes get lost in the 
excitement over new technologies, particularly in relation to genetics. More 
directly, with the advent of 4D ultrasound images, the public image of the 
foetus has again come to the fore in contemporary society and led to renewed 
political debate about abortion and women’s right to choose (Lee 2006). As 
such, the work of feminist writers to make sense of this iconic image remains 
continually relevant, as well as offering lessons for thinking about other 
associated technologies.  
 
In debates over abortion, the foetus and the woman have been continually 
positioned as antagonists. Given the stakes involved in such debates about 
personal integrity, individual responsibility, life and death, it is no wonder that 
many radical feminist authors have concentrated on refocusing the attention 
on women and away from the disembodied foetus (Michaels 1999:113). Such 
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writers have worked hard to decode and deconstruct the public foetus in our 
midst and have mobilised interpretative tools such as cultural criticism to 
contextualise the production and consumption of foetal images. Duden’s book 
is an important and interesting contribution to this effort, which is still taken up 
by authors writing in this field (For example, Michaels 1999, Haraway 2000; 
Rapp 2000).  As Sawicki notes, the work of radical feminist writers (such as 
Duden) has played an important role in “increasing scientific and technical 
literacy amongst feminists”, bringing the psychological and political risks of 
such technologies to the attention of a wider public and “provoking other 
oppositional discourses that can be further developed and used to resist their 
dangerous implications” (Sawicki 1991:70).  
 
Duden’s strategy is to seek to remind us (and in particular those who are 
involved in reproductive medicine) that pregnancy is concentrated in the 
embedded pregnant woman rather than the disembodied “public foetus” and 
she attempts to retrieve the embodied woman as the site of pregnancy 
through what Michaels has termed a “fetal disappearing act” (Michaels 
1999:120). Whilst this may create as many problems for women as it resolves 
(as I will discuss later), I would argue that, while the “public foetus” continues 
to loom large in the politics of abortion and women’s positions in relation to 
the new reproductive technologies remain contested, Duden’s work remains 
important in the continuing debate about how women’s reproductive freedom 
can be continually re-negotiated and re-established. 
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The Expansion of a Horizoni 
Duden draws together a number of strands of scientific, religiousii, political 
and cultural thought in her argument to present a powerful expression of the 
alienation of the pregnant woman from her own body – something she terms 
“skinning”. I will seek to draw out a number of those strands and examine 
them critically. Firstly, I will examine what Duden means when she refers to 
women’s “felt experience of pregnancy”iii I will then move on to look at her 
critique of the medicalisation of pregnancy through the scientific and political 
creation and management of a foetal population. An important part of this is 
what Duden terms the “public foetus”, by which she means the way in which 
the increasing visibility of the image of the foetus has affected pregnant 
women’s view of their own bodies. It is worth commenting at this stage, that 
there is a considerable overlap between the two strands of medicine and 
culture and that each is mobilised to reinforce the other. 
 
 “The Quickening”iv: 
Although this does not become clear from her article in Science and Culture 
(Duden 1993b), in her book, Duden sets up a form of historical comparison to 
reveal the intimate bodily experience that she feels that women have lost and 
to demonstrate how the control and expression of pregnancy has been 
shaped by modern visual technology; firstly of the x ray and the photograph 
then increasingly by the institution of the foetal sonogram or ultrasound 
image. In brief, she seeks to persuade the reader that because of the 
predominance of the ultrasound image in modern pregnancy, vision has 
become the primary sensory experience of the pregnant womanv. The 
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consequence of this is that she fears that pregnant women have lost the 
ability to feel or communicate the more intangible emotions and experiences 
of pregnancy and their experience of pregnancy has been restricted by the 
fact that they are forced to see, represent and imagine that which was 
previously unseen (Duden 1993a:8). 
 
Duden describes the history of the unbornvi as until relatively recently the 
history of the unseen, the invisible. She notes that the unborn was never there 
with any certainty and could be described as a “not yet” – a peculiar non-
temporal dimension more usually culturally associated with intangible bodies 
such ghosts and angels (Duden 1993a:9). Thus for Duden’s historical woman, 
pregnancy was ultimately a “tentative”vii experience in its early stages (Duden 
1993a:83).  
 
To demonstrate her point, Duden enters into a dialogue with the past to 
expose the hiatus between woman’s historical experience of pregnancy and 
that of the modern woman using a number of historical accounts of pregnancy 
recorded in the notes of a German doctor, Johann Storch. She relates that 
prior to the institution of the clinical gaze in the Enlightenment period (and 
more recently the new visual technologies available to doctors), a doctor 
entered into a discourse with the female patient to discover her symptoms and 
understanding of her own body. The testimony given by the woman was taken 
in through the doctor’s ears not his eyes and the resulting diagnosis and 
treatment was a combination of imagination and experience that was 
understood by both parties. The descriptions given by these historical women 
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are blindly sensual in their nature. They speak of ebbing and flowing, rushing 
and heat. Influenced by this, Duden describes the historical pregnancy as a 
haptic or sensory state of woman known only to others through her own 
testimony. She states that pregnancy was matter of “impenetrable female 
intimacy”, which only became positively known to a woman (and the public at 
large) through “quickening” (inner felt experience), felt by her alone and 
publicly announced by her. Prior to quickening, women were not definitively 
considered to be pregnant. 
 
In comparison to this gradual sensory awareness of the historical woman, 
Duden notes that the modern woman learns of her pregnancy initially through 
a chemical test, the results of which are re-enforced when ultrasound screen 
invades her interior and presents her with a “picture” of the foetus. Through 
the advance of visual technology, which has facilitated the pushing back of 
the visual boundaries, Duden writes despairingly that “the hope represented 
by the unseen in history has now been dissolved into expectationviii that can 
be managed at will, scientifically, sociologically and arbitrarily.” (Duden 
1993a:10).  
 
This question as to whether ultrasound is a source of empowerment and 
increased knowledge about the foetus (for the expectant parents and the 
medical profession) or merely a means of moving the ownership of knowledge 
from lay to expert hands has been addressed by feminist anthropologists such 
as Saetnan (2000) and Rapp (2000). ix Saetnan agrees with Duden that the 
ultrasound scan is presented to women as more knowledgeable about their 
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bodies than they are themselves. However, interestingly Saetnan notes that 
this did not undermine women’s confidence in their own knowledge of their 
bodies. The women in her study did not allow the scan to usurp their self-
knowledge. However, neither did they reject the ultrasound results entirely, 
instead they found ways of integrating their two narratives into one whole 
(Saetnan 2000:351).x.  
 
Rapp’s work on amniocentesis would seem more strongly to support Duden’s 
argument in that she found that foetal imagery has changed women’s 
perceptions of pregnancy and that “for most women, internal images of their 
pregnancies had been refocused through the lens of sonography, eclipsing 
any less standardized embodied notions of what the [foetus] felt like. Their 
internal states were now technologically redescribed” (Rapp 2000:125). 
Rapp’s study seems to confirm Duden’s anxieties about pregnancy no longer 
being individual and private but also becoming public and political through the 
use of ultrasound technology and the prevalence of the foetal image in public, 
cultural and political life. This does not mean that women necessarily accept 
medical authority and Rapp found that, even in situations where women 
receive a diagnosis of foetal abnormality, interpretative flexibility could remain 
and women still can and sometimes do, “opt off the medical conveyor belt” 
declining further tests or abortion when one test has shown suspicious results 
(Rapp 2000). However, she recognises the use of such technology by the 
medical profession to stake their claim to authority over the foetus (Rapp 
2000:121) and that is the next aspect of Duden’s work that I would like to 
consider. 
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Medicalisation and the “Public Foetus” 
 
“I don’t think they can hear me….and I’m nearly sure they can’t see me. I feel 
as if I were invisible” (Carroll 1997) 
 
From the approval implicit in Duden’s accounts of Dr Storch’s interaction with 
his female patients, it would seem that she is not opposed to medical 
intervention in pregnancy per se. However, she is concerned that the power 
over the experience of pregnancy has swung decisively away from women in 
favour of the rights of the foetus. The way in which she sees this shift taking 
place is through the increasingly public predominance of the visualisation of 
the autonomous foetus from an early stage in pregnancy, the removal of the 
body of pregnant woman from the visual and cultural discourses and the 
consequent call for an increase in the medical management of pregnancy.  
 
To turn firstly to the increasing public visibility of foetal images, the first sight 
of the embryo and foetus in the media has been traced back by Duden to 
Lennart Nilsson’s photographs published in Time magazine in the 1960s.xi 
The irony of these images, which were hailed as a first glimpse beyond the 
boundary of the female body, as pictures of new life, is that they were in fact 
intensely stage-managed photographs of dead embryos made available to 
Nilsson after they had been aborted (Newman 1996). However, at the time of 
publication, this irony passed unremarked and the highly emotive photographs 
were quickly seized upon by anti abortion activists as powerful tools in their 
campaign to politicise debates around the body of the pregnant woman 
(Petchesky 1987; Newman 1996). The power of these photographs lay in part 
 8 
in the fact that they could be interpreted through a common cultural 
experience without the need for an underlying expert medical discourse. This 
is not the case with ultrasound. 
 
Unlike Nilsson’s photographs, the image produced by the ultrasound has 
been described by Duden as a “cloudy chimera” (Duden 1993a:565). 
Although the most recent breakthrough in technology enables the production 
of very clear images of the foetus, at the time Duden was writing, the images 
produced by ultrasound could only be understood when mediated through 
medical discourse. However as with Nilsson’s photographs, these images 
have been appropriated by the media and by specific political groups and 
through the collapsing of the two images – the photograph and the ultrasound 
image – into one another, they have been invested with the powerful aura of a 
portrait (Petchesky 1987; Taylor 1993) through their designation as showing 
the existence of new life. Duden terms this powerful image “the public foetus”. 
It is implicit in Duden’s argument that it is not merely the ability of medical 
science to produce the image through ultrasound that has resulted in the 
alienation of the pregnant woman, rather it is the fact that the image has been 
commandeered by a particular political group and widely disseminated 
throughout the media within a specific cultural and political framework 
 
Duden expresses this concern clearly when she states that the “scientifically 
established facts pertaining to conception and birth have been graphically 
publicised by the media and thereby transformed into material for public 
events. The seemingly tangible reality appears in photographs or is pointed 
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out by TV experts taking on in the process a meaning beyond the purely 
medical” (Duden 1993a:51). In other words, she is concerned that the foetal 
image has been invested with cultural and political meaning through the 
interplay of imagination, political and religious discourses and media 
representation. It has gained a cultural meaning beyond its medical 
usefulness and come to represent life. Ultrasound images have assisted in 
this creation of life not only through the production of the image itself but also 
through the fact that they can be watched in real time like a video or television 
(Duden 1993; Franklin et al 2000). This ability to see ultrasound images in 
real time re-enforces the impression of truth. It’s there, you can see it, it must 
be real (Duden 1993a:575). Duden persuasively suggests that the visibility of 
the foetal image has permitted a further re-writing of the meaning of life itself 
as the boundaries of the visible horizon are moved back through the medium 
of the ultrasound from the time of birth to the time of conception. 
 
The ease with which this has taken place and been accepted has been 
attributed in feminist discourses to be due to a combination of factors; the 
power of the image, a privileging of enlightenment notions of rights bearing 
subjects and the absence of the mother from the picture. Duden mobilises a 
number of these discourses to present her argument. She suggests that the 
(inadvertent) erasure of the mother, in Nilsson’s photographs and through the 
way in which the ultrasound is set up, has provided the emotional and political 
means for the interests of foetus to be seen in opposition in medical and legal 
terms to its mother (see also Haraway 2000). The Foetus is not seen in 
connection with the pregnant woman and thus can be represented as a 
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unique rights bearing subject – an autonomous being. Duden argues that the 
proliferation of these disembodied images into the public consciousness 
means that when women look at an ultrasound image of their interior in real 
time, they superimpose the image of the “public foetus” onto the shadows on 
the screen and interiorise all that that “cultural icon” has come to mean in 
contemporary discourses (Petchesky 1987:62). 
 
It has been argued elsewhere that the rise of visual productions of knowledge 
facilitates the blurring of the boundaries between the medical, social, political 
and cultural as scientific looking is inevitably always caught up in culturally 
influenced forms of looking (Franklin et al 2000:279). For Duden, the way in 
which the medical technology of the ultrasound has been appropriated by 
discourses outside medicine is the ultimate example of the way in which a 
kind of medical looking and a medical artefact can become invested with 
public meaning and cultural desires. 
 
Duden is disturbed by the willingness of women to accept the prevalent 
discourses surrounding the public foetus and by doing so also accepting what 
they see on the ultrasound as a life. She terms this apparent willingness to 
see what we are told to see “vision on command” (Duden 1993a:568). She 
argues perceptively that the post-modern generation is culturally trained to 
dissociate vision (passive looking) from sight (active looking). She notes that 
modern women are socialised by a plethora of visual images in their everyday 
life and become habituated to seeing what they are told that they see rather 
than bringing their own images and experience to an interpretation of the 
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image before them. She argues that the tendency of the post-modern 
generation to see what they are told is particularly acute when the images are 
presented in a medical context and backed by the authority of science.  
 
Inherent also in Duden’s concept of “vision on command” within the intimate 
space of pregnancy is the confident authority of the clinical gaze. Duden 
proceeds from the assumption shared by much feminist writing that the bio-
medical profession still adheres to the positivistic Enlightenment views of truth 
production identified by Foucault (Foucault 1978 & 1980; Oakley 1987; 
Newman 1996; Franklin et al 2000; Taylor 1998). The consequence of this for 
Duden is that pregnant women tend to be accepting of the underlying medical 
assertion that the clinical gaze aided by the ultrasound produces a more 
truthful, authoritative knowledge of the foetus than the vague sensory 
explanation of her pregnancy that could be provided by the woman herself.xii 
Through the clinical gaze read off from the ultrasound image and analysed 
through the filter of scientific knowledge and experience, the medical expert 
can determine size, stage of development and (hopefully)xiii identify any 
inherent abnormalities, information that the pregnant woman could not provide 
from her own experience. 
 
However, Duden notes that in medical terms alone, ultrasound diagnoses in 
respect of abnormality have been wrong sufficiently often to raise the question 
as to why it remains the predominant technology in antenatal care and 
something that most women will be subjected to at least once during 
pregnancy.xiv This is where, for Duden, the “Public Foetus” again comes into 
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play. She argues that ultrasound remains popular because of the foetus is no 
longer just a medical image but also a cultural image, one for Duden, which 
represents the invasion of the medical and political into the private space of 
the pregnant woman. The fact that the image has also been utilised by non 
medical advertisements signifying special care for the body by evoking the 
authority of scientific knowledge appears to re-enforce Duden’s argument of 
the power of the foetal image (Taylor 1993). Other writers have taken this 
argument further or presented it in a different way. 
 
Petchesky has noted that the ultrasound “picture” has become a cultural right 
of passage in Western societies through which women and their families get 
their first “portrait” of their child for the baby book. In this way, the image of the 
foetus could be seen to represent a scientific image translated not only into a 
cultural and public artefact but also into a personal context, a context which it 
seems Duden is reluctant to address. (Duden in her case study of “Joanne” 
skates over the issue of attachment to the foetal image in a personal way very 
briefly). Further, although Duden does not deal in any detail with this effect of 
the image, other writers have discussed the question of bonding and the 
suggested power of ultrasound to encourage emotional bonding much more 
than a textual description of the foetus ever could (Petchesky 1987; Taylor 
1998, Franklin et al 2000). The issue of the personal value of the ultrasound in 
this way is addressed specifically by Taylor who examines how the image is 
said to provide paradoxically reassurance and the opportunity for the pregnant 
woman to bond with her child to be.  
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Whilst Rapp’s study takes up this aspect of power of the foetal image and the 
way in which the viewing of such images is orchestrated, she also recognises 
the complexities of the image when she notes that, “Surely, neither pregnant 
women and their supporters nor members of the right to life movement are 
thinking about the embedded, reductive and normalising aspects of imaging 
technology as they “meet” a baby on a television monitor for the first time” 
(Rapp 2000:119). She agrees with Duden that foetal imagery has changed 
the ways in which women think about pregnancy and respond to the anxiety 
of grading, normalising and controlling pregnancy. However, she argues that 
this anxiety is multilayered as it feeds upon older, more existential fears about 
the tenuousness of pregnancy, which is given “new salience and 
medicalisation through technological intervention and political debate”. (Rapp 
2000:128). 
 
In summary, Duden argues that the proliferation of the “Public Foetus” has 
facilitated the blurring of the boundary between the medical and the social 
thus facilitating the exclusion of a more individualistic and personal 
experience of pregnancy. She has demonstrated how the biomedical image, 
when transported into the public arena, takes on the “aura” of a portrait and it 
is from this point that the giant leap of faith from scientific fact to living being 
takes place. The ultrasound image becomes a document of the foetus’s status 
as a social being and not just a biological entity. The Foetus becomes an 
autonomous being, a rights bearing citizen. This has had an important effect 
on the legal status of the foetus in that it has created a legal space for it to 
 14 
speak through the medium of adults representing its interests against those of 
the pregnant woman.xv 
 
Normalisation of Pregnancy 
Very briefly above, I have attempted to summarise a number of 
consequences, implicit and explicit, that arise from Duden’s exposition of the 
public foetus. However, the consequence that most interests Duden is the 
way in which the public foetus has lead to a normalisation of the medical 
model of pregnancy and the effect this has had on the meaning of pregnancy 
for women. 
 
She is concerned that the consequence of this proliferation of foetal images 
and the blurring of the boundaries between science and culture has been a 
strengthened demand for the administrative control of pregnancy and the 
extension of legal protection of the foetus against the mother (Duden 
1993a:52). In the Western world, it is now commonplace from the time of 
conception, for the medical profession to take over the conduct of a 
pregnancy and monitor the pregnant woman in a way that privileges the 
foetus over the experience of the mother. Duden demonstrates this through a 
case study of a pregnant woman in a Harlem clinic. The subject, “Maria” is 
shown graphs of the normal pregnancy and is told in terms of the risk factors 
where she is situated on the curve of the graph. Duden expresses horror at 
this process and suggests that the use of graphs in antenatal care reduces 
pregnancy to statistics and takes away the personal nature of each 
pregnancy. She argues that the use of statistics based upon a set of fixed 
 15 
terms such as age and background have the effect of normalising and selling 
a typical pregnancy as each individual pregnancy is seen within a conceptual 
framework of norms. In order to understand what is being said to her in the 
clinic, the pregnant woman has to stretch her imagination to grasp 
abstractions that remove her from the intimate experience of the past, where 
her expression of her intimate sensory experiences led the discussion of the 
pregnancy. Duden makes clear that she is not questioning the antenatal 
procedures that she is observing from standpoint of their technical efficiency 
but from their effect on the psyche of the pregnant woman (Duden 
1993a:581). She notes that the experts seek to convince the pregnant woman 
that prenatal procedures are good. The implicit assumptions in this however 
are that pregnancy implies risk, demands supervision and imposes decisions. 
It “requires a large bureaucratic apparatus to encourage passage through the 
maze” (Duden 1993a:582) The woman’s body becomes a space for 
technocratic and bureaucratic intervention when the unborn child is discussed 
in terms of risk and probability and thus transformed from an individual foetus 
into a morsel of population. Duden is concerned that this management of 
pregnancy reduces innumerable intimate female experiences of pregnancy to 
a quantum and accepts the cultural and political model of the foetus as a 
citizen.  
 
As noted above, the use of ultrasound technology supports this medical 
model of pregnancy by the way in which the image is mediated through expert 
medical discourses at a stage in the pregnancy where a woman could not 
provide the kind of information that the doctors seem to be seeking, about for 
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example the stage of development of the foetus. Duden fears that the 
technique of ultrasound has replaced dialogue between the doctor and the 
pregnant woman and underpins the impression that doctors know more about 
the pregnancy than the woman herself ever could. In this way, the pregnant 
woman becomes habituated to being told how her pregnancy is progressing 
and accepts the “truth” that the professionals know more about her future 
child than she can herself (Duden 1993a:583).  
 
Duden’s conclusion is that new forms of perception, images, concepts and 
attitudes have been made possible by the development of ultrasound 
technology. The technique has changed the position of pregnant woman 
irrevocably, not only in medical terms but also their social, legal and cultural 
position in society. However, she does not see this change as positive but as 
the loss of an important space and source of power for women. 
 
“Compared to historical women, a modern woman has no comparable power 
to define her social status by making a statement about her body. In our 
society we are accepted as sick, healthy or pregnant only when certified as 
such by a professional. Historically, woman had the power to testify to an 
experience which was not just private but ultimately not shareable.” (Duden 
1993a:94) 
 
She notes ironically that while the interior of women’s bodies has become 
public, medically, administratively and judicially, the exterior of the female 
body remains privatised, ideologically and culturally. 
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Revisiting the “Public Foetus” 
“Pregnancies, when they occur, occur in women’s’ bodies. For those who 
champion “choice” to lose sight of this simple and obvious, yet profoundly 
radical fact in a post 1980s struggle for reproductive freedom would be finally 
to surrender the possibility of freedom” (Hartouni 1997:288) 
 
Duden’s final comments on the changing social construction of women 
suggest firstly that she subscribes to the somewhat monolithic radical feminist 
theories which argue that the new reproduction technologies are an attempt 
by the male dominated fields of science and technology to appropriate the 
reproductive capacities that have been women’s unique source of power 
(Stanworth 1987; Sawicki 1991). Further, although this is at no time made 
explicit in her work, it would seem that she subscribes to the essentialist 
feminist theories that argue that the production of knowledge through 
visualisation and objectification is specifically masculine (Fuss 1989, Stacey 
1993).  
 
Whilst I would agree that the history of science and medicine has been male 
dominated in Western Society and that this has inevitable effects upon the 
treatment of the female subjects of these powerful biomedical discourses, I 
am troubled by Duden’s conclusions which seem to suggest that there is little 
women can do to resist this power or reclaim their bodies from the oppressive 
(male) gaze.  
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I have noted earlier, the influence on Duden’s work of Foucauldian theories of 
the production of power through the creation of privileged discourses of 
knowledge. Whilst Foucault provides a very useful method for exposing the 
threads of power exercised through these discourses, one criticism that has 
been made of his early work is that his critique leaves existing gender 
divisions intact (McNeil 1993; Sawicki 1991). In other words, the use of his 
work may make us aware of the patterns of power that exist in society but he 
does not provide the tools for shifting those patterns or resisting them. My 
own response to Duden’s essay echoes this criticism. Her argument is very 
powerful and in many ways persuasive but I would resist her conclusion that 
women are powerless to resist or engage with the discourses that attempt to 
shape their experience of pregnancy. In many ways, appealing to a pre-
modern era is unhelpful to the majority of women facing decisions about 
childbirth in the UK today.  
 
I do accept and agree that the technologies for managing pregnancy are often 
embedded in a medical frame of reference that defines women as patients 
and pregnancy as illness. To discuss pregnancy in this way, inevitably results 
in the de-emphasis of the social and emotional dimensions of the experience. 
Undoubtedly, many women are left with the sense of being onlookers in the 
process of giving birth. However, Duden’s approach tends to suggest that 
anything less than a natural process of pregnancy and childbirth represents 
the degradation of motherhood itself. The danger in this argument is that the 
motherhood that is being taken from women through the new visual 
technologies becomes something that is biologically determined and 
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something to which all women are assumed to have the same relationship 
(Stanworth 1987). In taking this approach, Duden risks inflating the 
importance of scientific and medical practice in 20th century pregnancy to 
pregnancy’s defining factor and by so doing she produces a mirror image of 
the concept of pregnancy that is being produced by the medical practitioners 
themselves. I would argue that social shaping is not the same as 
determination. The fact that Duden has identified a system of sanctions and/or 
rewards existing within the social and medical framework to encourage 
women to co-operate with medical antenatal care indicates that conformity is 
not guaranteed and that resistance is a genuine option that efforts are made 
to curtail (Stanworth 1987:17; Rapp 2000; Saetnan 2000). 
 
Indeed, at the time that Duden was writing, multiple possible sites of 
resistance to the dominant discourses of reproductive politics were already 
being explored (Sawicki 1991:70). One such method, discussed by Jana 
Sawicki, is to utilise the possibilities of resistance recognised in Foucault’s 
later work (for example The History of Sexuality 1978) and develop it from a 
feminist perspective. Sawicki suggests that although reproductive 
technologies are largely controlled by non-feminist forces, these forces are 
not unified and it can also be assumed that women and feminists have played 
a role in defining past and current practices. She argues that we should not 
focus solely on the dominant discourses of the medical profession but also on 
the “moments of resistance” from individuals (men and women) and organised 
interest groups representing scientists, economists and women that have 
resulted in the transformation of the practices surrounding childbirth over the 
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years (Sawicki 1991:80). She does not seek to contradict the suggestion by 
Duden and that medicine has had a monopoly over reproduction during this 
century but rather asks us to consider that this control is not simply imposed 
from the top but has had to be won and continually faces resistancexvi. 
 
Duden’s standpoint approach is both impassioned and convincing. However, 
the question that she fails to ask is how can feminists devise strategies to 
engage in the struggle over who defines women’s needs and how they are 
satisfied. She operates within a binary model of alternatives (technology 
versus natural) that has a tendency to portray the power of the (patriarchal) 
medical profession in monolithic terms. This situates all pregnant women as 
victims and passive subjects. She seems to assume that women have to 
succumb and fails to take some women’s desire for such technologies 
seriously (see Mitchell et al 2000; Farquar 2000).  
 
Further, Duden’s account of the biomedical and political discourses 
surrounding ultrasound technology fails to recognise that pregnant women 
may talk about, use and perceive the image projected by the ultrasound in a 
different way to the male (or female) doctors, scientists or politicians that she 
seeks to expose and that this female personal engagement with the 
technology may be equally valid. Duden’s portrayal of her post modern 
women in the shape of “Joanne” and “Maria” seems disturbingly passive and 
accepting of their fate. I would question whether this is really the case. There 
is no doubt that some women derive pleasure and comfort from the chance to 
see their baby (Petchesky 1987; Taylor 1998, Rapp 2000). Duden’s account 
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of “Joanne” passing around her ultrasound “picture” would seem to accept this 
possibility. However, Duden neatly side steps the issue of the validity of 
Joanne’s pleasure at the image and submerges it within her wider discussion 
of the implication of seeing a life in the image. As Franklin, Lury and Stacey 
have suggested “experiences and interpretations of images are never 
singular, discrete events but are informed by a broader set of conditions and 
factors” (Franklin et al:297). Women are not naïve nor are they passive and 
there is evidence to suggest that they are sufficiently visually sophisticated to 
go beyond what Duden terms “vision on command” and appropriate the 
artefacts constructed by bio-medical culture to construct their “own cultural 
narratives inflected with other aspects of their worlds”xvii.  
 
In absenting the above issue from her discussion, Duden avoids having to 
address difficult questions about how or even whether women ought to use 
reproductive technologies. Such questions can’t be answered from the 
standpoint of the common historical reproductive consciousness that Duden 
seeks to persuade the reader was the birthright of the historical pregnant 
woman. While I would agree with her that the historical experience of 
pregnancy cannot be regained, I would ask whether we should really wish to 
turn back the clock in this way. 
 
Duden suggests that the only way for women to regain a “true” haptic 
experience of pregnancy would be to resist the use of the new technologies, 
although in the same breath she acknowledges that in our twentieth century 
visually sophisticated society, this is not possible.xviii I do not agree that the 
 22 
fact that women cannot revert to the social and cultural experience of 
pregnancy of her 18th Century counterpart is necessarily a bad thing or that it 
means that women cannot have a holistic experience of pregnancy. In 2001, 
the Guardian Weekend magazine ran a two-part article on one woman’s 
experience of a wanted pregnancy (Enright 2001). Although to some extent, 
Anne Enright’s account of her pregnancy provides support for Duden’s 
argument that the visual image produced by the ultrasound causes women to 
see their pregnancy in a different way, the overwhelming impression gained 
from the article is the embodied way in which women experience pregnancy 
on a personal level. Of course, this does not necessarily detract from what 
Duden is saying about the impact of the foetal image on a public level or from 
the effect it may have on women who wish to have an abortion but it does 
suggest that twentieth century pregnant women are able to detach their own 
pregnancies from the type of political and cultural discourses associated with 
the public image of the foetus and experience them in a holistic way, 
combining the visual image in a positive way with the more sensual embodied 
aspects of the experience. 
 
Petchesky has supported this view that women are able to distinguish 
between the private and public images of the foetus and she explores the way 
in which women have been able to subvert the gaze and actively participate in 
their pregnancies through this distinction (Petchesky 1987; Shohat 1992). 
Contrary to the view posited by Duden, she notes that women have not just 
been victims of reproductive technologies but that they have in many cases 
generated the demands for some of the technologies now available, such as 
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the contraceptive pill and infertility treatments (Petchesky 1987:72). Further, 
they can challenge the norms established by the medical profession by 
refusing to accept ultrasound, sharing their experiences and exposing 
inadequacies in the model of treatment. Finally, Petchesky seeks to introduce 
the concept of social and biological differences such as class, race, sexual 
preference, age and fertility history to undermine the predominant feminist 
discourse of a collective reproductive consciousness and construct a 
persuasive argument that “techniques for imaging foetuses and pregnancies 
may, depending on their cultural contexts and uses, offer means for 
empowering women, both individually and collectively.” (Petchesky 1987:78).  
 
This analysis is supported by the work of feminist anthropologists such as 
Rapp, Mitchell and Saetnan. Their work has uncovered the diverse 
relationships that women occupy in relation to these technologies. Rapp 
argues it is important to focus on the pregnant woman in relation to all of 
these social relationships, not just her relationship to medical professionals. 
Her observations were that the group best served by advances in 
reproductive medicine – white middle class women – were also the most 
vulnerable to its powerful definitions of motherhood (Rapp 2000). This finding 
is echoed by anthropological studies of the use of ultrasound in Canada and 
Greece, which found that the use and understanding of ultrasound images 




By directing our attention to the differences among women and to the 
intersecting social relations in which women are situated, we are more likely 
to locate what Foucault refers to as “subjugated knowledges” – that is forms 
of experience and knowledge that have not previously been articulated, 
namely the discourses of women as to how they are affected by new 
reproductive technologies, the material condition of their lives, their own 
description of their needs and of pregnancy.  
 
Whilst I agree with Spivak (1998), Irigaray and Fuss (1989) that essentialism 
can have a powerful place in feminist writing as part of an important dialogue 
of resistance for displacing and disrupting dominant masculine discourses, the 
risk in such a strategy is that it oversimplifies the variety of women’s 
experiences of pregnancy. Narratives such as Duden’s are “invested in 
reaffirming traditional ideas of what women essentially are rather than 
contesting them or encouraging the construction of new ones” (Farquar 2000: 
212). The possible consequences for women of the new reproductive 
technologies have been powerfully exposed by essays such as Duden’s but 
now the difference approach taken by authors such as Petchesky, Rapp and 
Saetnan of speaking to rather than about women, provides a practical means 
of engagement in rather than alienation from the current debates (see also 
Spivak 1988). 
 
In contrast to Duden, I would suggest that rather than finding ways to opt out 
of post-modern society, women should seek to engage in a way that is 
meaningful to them in the society in which they live. In the late twentieth 
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century, that inevitably involves new technology. As Petchesky has 
commented “to reduce technology to a weapon in a male war against the 
womb is to submerge women’s own responses to pregnancy in male fantasies 
of power and succumb to technological determinism” (Petchesky 1987:71). 
 
Naturally, women may be wary of new medical innovations in reproductive 
technology due to their knowledge and experience of the ambivalent effects of 
medical technologies on their lives in the past. It is for precisely this reason 
that the assessment of the risks and benefits of any technology that affects 
women so directly can’t be left to the (male) experts. Women have to engage 
with science and ask does it work, does it deliver what it promises, what are 
the risks. As Stanworth has explained, risk not purely a technical matter, it 
also contains a social dimension; what is acceptable to the patient (Stanworth 
1987:33). As Haraway has argued generally, if women seek to engage with 
techno science, it may be that they will have some effect on ensuring that 
criteria used for assessing new technologies incorporate women’s own 
priorities (Haraway 1997). 
 
Donna Haraway’s difficult but innovative work has suggested a further way in 
which women can resist dominant male discourses, namely by creating their 
own discourses, by appropriating for themselves the images that have worked 
against them. From the mid 1980s some feminist critics have sought to 
subvert the public foetus in this way by drawing on Haraway’s work and 
conceptualising the foetal image as a cyborg (see also Kirkup et al 2000; 
Bidduck 1993:168).  
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Alternatively, rather than appropriating problematic and disembodied images 
of the foetus, other feminists have sought to challenge such visual images by 
creating new subjective and embodied images of pregnancy. One example is 
Annie Liebovitz’s photograph of a naked and heavily pregnant Demi Moore, 
which appeared on the cover of Vanity Fair in August 1991. At the time, the 
image provoked outrage and appeared in newsstands in America covered in 
brown paper wrappers. However, it may be significant that since this image 
appeared, there has been an emergence of alternative images of pregnant 
women within British popular culture (Tyler 1996:300). Although I fully accept 
that this type of glamour photography of pregnant celebrities is not 
unproblematic for women seeking to break the constraints of patriarchal 
ideology, it may present a context that would allow women to resist the 
disembodied foetal images of pregnancy and re-establish different discourses 
of pregnancy as an embodied female experience.  
 
In summary, the project that I would wish feminist writers to undertake is to 
consider the question of whether it is possible to create the political and 
cultural conditions in which the new reproductive technologies can be 
employed by women to shape the experience of pregnancy according to their 
own definitions. Two ways in which this project could be undertaken, (as 
suggested by Petchesky, Sawicki, Haraway and others and discussed briefly 
above), would be through the production of new discourses and new images 
of pregnancy and the re-contextualising and re-embodying of the foetus so 
that the woman is no longer seen as secondary to her foetus, simply its eco-
system. Once the resources with which to reframe pregnant embodiment and 
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subjectivity have been imagined and created then it may be possible to 
“establish woman centred territory at the centre of reproductive politics” 
(Franklin 1991:204). In response to changes in what matters and what is 
significant, women’s reproductive freedom must be established over and over 
again. We cannot reject the dominant definitions of the “Public Foetus” so 
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i Duden uses the powerful metaphor of the horizon throughout her book to represent the boundaries of 
the visible and the possible. 
 
ii Duden’s essay starts with the religious backdrop to the abortion debate in Germany and at points 
throughout the essay she draws upon religious discourses that surround the issues of reproductive 
control. Whilst I accept the power of religious discourses to effect a change in society, it does not seem 
to me that the influence of religion in the UK has the same hold as it does in Germany and the USA 
and so for this and other reasons, I have not discussed this aspect of Duden’s essay in any depth. 
 
iii A number of feminist writers in this area have discussed the objectification of woman through 
medical intervention in pregnancy and how this takes away from women’s felt experience. See Taylor 
(1998) page 27 and Oakley (1987) page 37. However, Duden uses the term “felt experience” in a very 
specific and historically grounded way. 
 
iv Quickening was the term used historically to indicate the point at which pregnancy moved from a 
tentative maybe to definite sign. This term has historical legal resonance as Sarah Franklin has 
discussed in her article in relation to the point at which abortion was no longer possible. See Franklin 
(1991): Fetal Fascinations: new dimensions of medical scientific personhood in Franklin, Lury and 
Stacey (eds): Off Centre: Feminist and Cultural Studies, London, Harper & Collins at page 198 
 
v There is a certain irony in the way in which ultrasound has come to be seen as a window on the body 
in that it is primarily a technology based upon sound waves rather than vision. It has been suggested 
that the reason the technology is set up in such a way as to translate sound waves into a visual images is 
the preference in modern culture for a visual image. See Franklin, Lury and Stacey (2000) at p. 300 
 
vi Throughout her book, Duden uses the term “unborn” to denote the embryo or foetus embodied within 
the mother. She uses this to distance and contrast the pregnant woman with the public foetus. 
 
vii For a different consideration of pregnancy as a tentative condition in relation to the issue of the 
reassurance about lack of abnormality provided by ultrasound imaging see Janelle Taylor (1998): 
Image of Contradiction: Obstetrical Ultrasound in American Culture, in Sarah Franklin and Helena 
Ragone, Reproducing Reproduction, University of Pennsylvania Press pp. 15-45. 
 
viii For an account of the commodification of the modern foetus see Janelle Taylor (1998) 
 
ix Saetnan’s study seemed to suggest that for those women who were going through their first 
pregnancy and had not yet experienced the baby move, the ultrasound did seem to carry more authority 
than other clinical tests and experienced pregnancy symptoms. It made the pregnancy seem more real 
to them (Saetnan 200:339). However, for other women who had felt “quickening”, the sensations of 
their own bodies took precedence over the ultrasound images. Saetnan’s conclusion was that the visual 
images did not push aside the signals that women felt from within their own bodies and that generally, 
the images functioned as a supplement to rather than a replacement of the women’s embodied 
experiences of pregnancy (Saetnan 2000:340). However, Saetnan did note that in order for women to 
make the translation from the images on the screen to their bodily sensations, they had to some degree 
to “subordinate themselves to medical authority” in as far as most of the women relied on the 
midwife’s interpretation of the images rather than what they themselves could see. Nevertheless, 
Saetnan concludes that most of the women were able to maintain to some extent, an interpretation of 
the scan as an opportunity to see the baby even as they recognised that the medical role of the 
ultrasound was for diagnostic purposes (Saetnan 2000:341). 
 
 
x None of the women in the survey had received a negative diagnosis (in the sense that there were 
problems with the foetus) and Saetnan considers that if this had been the case, it may have been more 
difficult to resist a medical construction of the pregnancy (Saetnan 2000:351) 
 
xi  Petchesky (1987) ibid note 19 mentions a different magazine a few years earlier in her article. Karen 
Newman (1996) ibid note 4 suggests that foetal images have been around far longer but makes 
 29 
                                                                                                                                            
reference to medical textbooks and I think she misses the point in that many of the drawings represent 
homunculi rather than true foetal images. Further, medical diagrams and representations were not 
widely available for utilisation in cultural and social discourse in the sense that images of the foetus are 
in the twentieth century. Duden makes clear in her article that she is distinguishing between 
diagrammatic representation and facsimile. 
 
xii That is assuming that the woman is allowed to enter into a dialogue with the medical expert. Taylor 
(1998) has noted that since gynaecologists have been able to determine due dates from ultrasound 
images, in many instances woman are no longer even asked for the date of their last period as it is 
assumed that the information gleaned from the image will be more truthful and accurate than the 
woman’s own testimony. 
 
xiii The reason that I have inserted hopefully here is that a number of writers including Duden (1993) 
and Taylor (1998) have noted that the claim that abnormalities can be discovered earlier through the 
use of ultrasound technology doesn’t seem to be borne out in practice. There have been many mistakes 
made in diagnosis and consequently the medical use of the ultrasound in antenatal care for this purpose 
has come under some scrutiny. 
 
xiv The statistics used by Duden (1993) suggested that a high percentage of women were exposed to 
ultrasound but by no means all. Janelle Taylor’s more recent article (1998) would seem to suggest that 
almost all women now experience at least one ultrasound during pregnancy and that if they do not for 
some reason, they are now inclined to demand one. 
 
xv An extreme example of foetal rights displacing those of its mother can be seen in a number of 
disturbing cases of women being kept on life support machines, in some case against their express 
wishes until the child can be born by caesarean. For an account of the legal position of the foetus and 
embryo see Alison Young (1993) Decapitation of Feticide: The Fetal Laws of the Universal Subject in 
Women: A Cultural Review 4, pp. 288-294, Petchesky (1987) and Julie Wallbank (1999): Throwing 
Baby out with the Bathwater: Some Reflections on Developments in Reproductive Technologies in Res 
Publica and (2000) Transforming the Monstrous into the Sacred (draft copy borrowed from author).  
 
xvi Ultrasound technology clearly fits within the Foucauldian model of disciplinary power. It involves 
sophisticated techniques of surveillance and examination that make foetuses visible in ways that 
facilitate the creation of new objects and subjects of medical as well as legal and state intervention. 
However, authors such as Farquar (2000) and Sawicki (1991) remind us that such power is diffuse, 
multifaceted and can operate both positively and negatively, enabling as well as controlling. As such, 
Jawicki’s interpretation of a Foucauldian understanding of power as “a myriad of shifting relations” 
does not undermine Duden’s analysis, rather it situates her appeal to a more holistic, maternal 
experience of pregnancy as only one of several strategies than can be employed to resist the 
medicalisation of pregnancy and women’s bodies.  
 
xvii A number of articles in the Guardian (for example Tues, Dec 28 1999 and 4 April 1999. There was 
also a more recent article in 2001) described how a group of artists have written graffiti over 
advertisements in such as way as to totally change the meaning of the advertisement from that 
intended. I would argue that in the current visual society, we are constantly engaging with and re-
negotiating images in this way putting them within our own contexts.  
 
xvii In this suggestion, Duden echoes concerns raised by FINRRAGE (Feminist International Network 
of Resistance to Reproductive and Genetic Engineering). This group argued in opposition to earlier 
liberal views of reproductive technologies, such as that of Shulamith Firestone who advocated their use 
to “free women from the tyranny of reproduction” (1970). The group of radical feminists who formed 
this association in 1984 saw motherhood as the foundation of women’s identity and saw reproductive 
technologies as an extension of patriarchal control and the exploitation of women’s’ bodies (see Corea 
1985). They believed that the new reproductive technologies offered a powerful means of social control 
because they would become standard practice as indeed the ultrasound examination is today. 
FINRRAGE saw reproductive technologies as linked to genetic engineering- for them, the female body 
was being expropriated as a “living laboratory” (Mahjouri 2004). To some extent, their arguments were 
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prescient in that techniques such as IVF now provide researchers with the embryo material on which to 
do stem cell research. However, they underestimated the extent to which women’s demands for the 
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